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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal presents a question of federal preemption 
law.  In November 2008, DVI Funding, LLC and several 
entities known as DVI Receivables filed involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions against Maury Rosenberg and his 
affiliated businesses.  After the Bankruptcy Court dismissed 
the involuntary petitions, Rosenberg recovered attorney’s 
fees, costs, and damages under § 303(i) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Now Rosenberg’s wife and several limited 
partnerships associated with Rosenberg—persons and entities 
not named in the bankruptcy—have brought a tortious 
interference claim under state law for damages allegedly 
caused by the filing of the involuntary petitions.  The District 
Court concluded that this claim was preempted by the 
Bankruptcy Code and dismissed the complaint.  For the 
reasons that follow, we reverse and remand, as we conclude 
that § 303(i) does not preempt the state law claims of non-
debtors predicated on the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition.    
4 
 
 
I. 
 It is an understatement to say that the factual 
background and procedural history lurking behind this case 
are complex.  Our appeal is but one fragment of more than a 
decade of ongoing litigation between Maury Rosenberg and 
his medical imaging centers on the one side and U.S. Bank 
and its affiliated entities on the other.  By our estimate, that 
litigation has produced 27 written opinions at almost every 
level of the federal judiciary.  But lucky for us (and our 
readers), this case turns on a narrow question of federal 
preemption law.   
 Rosenberg is the “principal architect” of National 
Medical Imaging, LLC (“NMI”) and National Medical 
Imaging Holding Company, LLC (“NMI Holding”).  NMI 
and NMI Holding are affiliated with various limited 
partnerships (“NMI LPs”) that operate medical imaging 
centers.  To finance the purchase of medical imaging 
equipment, the NMI LPs entered into leases with DVI 
Financial Services, Inc., who transferred the leases to DVI 
Funding, LLC.  DVI Funding then held onto some of the 
leases directly and securitized the rest, transferring them to 
various entities with DVI Receivables in the name.  DVI 
Financial was the initial servicer of the leases and U.S. Bank 
acted as trustee.  When DVI Financial entered bankruptcy in 
2004, Lyon Financial, a subsidiary of U.S. Bank, acquired the 
servicing contracts.   
 During litigation in state court over money the NMI 
LPs owed under the leases, DVI Funding and five DVI 
Receivables entities filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions 
against Rosenberg, NMI, and NMI Holding in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
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Pennsylvania.  Rosenberg transferred his case to the Southern 
District of Florida, where the Bankruptcy Court there 
dismissed the involuntary petition because, among other 
things, DVI Funding and the DVI Receivables were not 
Rosenberg’s creditors.  In re Rosenberg, 414 B.R. 826, 840–
41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 472 Fed. App’x 890 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam).  The petitions against NMI and NMI 
Holding remained in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
where its Bankruptcy Court gave collateral estoppel effect to 
the Florida decision and dismissed the petitions.  In re Nat’l 
Med. Imaging, LLC, 439 B.R. 837, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2009), aff’d, __ Fed. App’x __, No. 15-1996, 2016 WL 
1743475 (3d Cir. 2016).   
 Rosenberg then filed in the Southern District of 
Florida Bankruptcy Court an adversary action under 11 
U.S.C. § 303(i) against DVI Funding, the DVI Receivables 
entities, Lyon, and U.S. Bank.  He sought to recover costs, 
attorney’s fees, and damages for the bad faith filing of the 
involuntary bankruptcy petition.  The Court awarded 
Rosenberg fees and costs after a bench trial, In re Rosenberg, 
No. 09-13196, 2012 WL 3990725 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 
2012), aff’d in part, 779 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 805 (2016), and transferred the claim for 
damages to the District Court for a jury trial.  After trial, the 
jury awarded Rosenberg $1.1 million in compensatory 
damages and $5 million in punitive damages.  The District 
Court initially overturned the punitive damages award in its 
entirety and limited compensatory damages to $360,000, but 
the Eleventh Circuit held that U.S. Bank’s post-trial motion 
was untimely and reinstated the jury’s verdict.  Rosenberg v. 
DVI Receivables, XIV, LLC, No. 12-22275, 2014 WL 
4810348 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014), rev’d in part, 818 F.3d 
1283 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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 With the stage set, we turn to the litigation currently on 
appeal.  In August 2013, Sara Rosenberg (Maury’s wife), the 
Rosenberg Trust, and several NMI Real Estate Partnerships 
(together with Mrs. Rosenberg and the Rosenberg Trust, the 
“Rosenberg Affiliates”) brought suit to recover damages 
stemming from the involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed 
against Maury Rosenberg, NMI, and NMI Holding.  All of 
the plaintiffs are affiliated with Maury Rosenberg, but none 
of them were parties to the involuntary bankruptcies.   
 The complaint stated a single claim of tortious 
interference with contracts and business relationships.  The 
NMI Real Estate Partnerships owned the medical imaging 
facilities subject to mortgages with various lenders.  The 
Rosenberg Affiliates alleged that the DVI Receivables 
entities, DVI Funding, Lyon Financial, Jane Fox (an agent for 
Lyon who signed the involuntary bankruptcy petitions), and 
U.S. Bank (collectively, the “Defendants”), orchestrated the 
filing of the involuntary bankruptcy petitions with the intent 
to cause the NMI Real Estate Partnerships to default on their 
underlying mortgages.  As a result, the Partnerships were 
declared in default, all but one of the properties have been 
lost, and Sara Rosenberg lost her interest in one of the 
Partnerships.  The Rosenberg Affiliates also alleged that the 
Rosenberg Trust suffered losses on investments in the 
Partnerships and life insurance for Maury Rosenberg.   
 The case was initially filed in the District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, but it transferred the case to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the motion of the 
Defendants.  They then moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
Rosenberg Affiliates’ state law tortious interference claim 
was preempted by the involuntary bankruptcy provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  The District Court agreed and 
dismissed the complaint.  Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables, XIV, 
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LLC, No. 14-5608, 2015 WL 3513445 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 
2015).  This appeal followed.   
 
II. 
 The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we have appellate jurisdiction 
to review its order dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss based on preemption is plenary.  New Jersey 
Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of New Jersey, 760 F.3d 
297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).  We accept all factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiffs.  Id.    
III. 
 Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code governs 
involuntary bankruptcy cases.  In an involuntary bankruptcy 
case it is the creditors, not the debtors, who start the 
proceedings by filing an involuntary petition under either 
Chapter 7 or 11 of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 303(b).  Important 
for our purposes is that § 303(i) provides that if an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition is dismissed, the debtor may 
recover attorney’s fees, costs, and even damages from the 
creditors.  It reads: 
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this 
section other than on consent of all petitioners 
and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive 
the right to judgment under this subsection, the 
court may grant judgment— 
 (1) against the petitioners and in favor of 
 the debtor for— 
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  (A) costs; or 
  (B) a reasonable attorney’s fee; or 
 (2) against any petitioner that filed the 
 petition in bad faith, for— 
  (A) any damages proximately  
  caused by such filing; or 
  (B) punitive damages 
Id. § 303(i).   
 As they were not debtors, the Rosenberg Affiliates 
cannot recover damages from the Defendants under § 303(i).  
See, e.g., In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 
2005); In re Mike Hammer Prods., Inc., 294 B.R. 752, 755 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003); In re VII Holdings Co., 362 B.R. 663, 
668 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Shannon, J.); Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 303.33 (16th ed.).  Shut off from a remedy 
under the Bankruptcy Code, the Rosenberg Affiliates are 
instead pursuing a state law tortious interference claim for 
damages caused by the involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed 
against Maury Rosenberg, NMI, and NMI Holding.  The 
question for us is whether § 303(i) preempts this state law 
claim.   
 Federal preemption of state law is a “necessary but 
precarious component of our system of federalism under 
which the states and the federal government possess 
concurrent sovereignty.”  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive 
Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016).  Under this dual 
system, federal and state law coexist peacefully much of the 
time.  But when those laws come into conflict, the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution requires that state law give way to 
federal law.  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.   
 Federal preemption of state law comes in three forms: 
express preemption, conflict preemption, and field 
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preemption.  Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Ours is a case of alleged field preemption.  It 
“occurs when a field is ‘reserved for federal regulation, 
leaving no room for state regulation,’ and ‘congressional 
intent to supersede state laws [is] clear and manifest.’”  Id. 
(quoting Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 
(3d Cir. 2009)).   
 In deciding whether Congress has occupied a field for 
exclusive federal regulation, we begin, based on concerns of 
federalism, with a sturdy “presumption against preemption.”  
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).  “This ‘strong 
presumption against inferring Congressional preemption’ also 
applies ‘in the bankruptcy context.’” In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. 
Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Integrated 
Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 
487, 493 (3d Cir. 1997)).  It is overcome when “a 
Congressional purpose to preempt . . . is clear and manifest.”  
Id. (quoting Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 117 (3d Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 365 (2011)).  To discern the 
preemptive intent of Congress, we look to the text, structure, 
and purpose of the statute and the surrounding statutory 
framework.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 
(1996).   
 The inquiry we make is whether there is enough 
evidence in the text, structure, or purpose of § 303(i) or the 
Bankruptcy Code as a whole to rebut the presumption against 
preemption and say that it was Congress’s “clear and manifest 
intent” to preempt state law causes of action for non-debtors 
based on the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.1  
We conclude that the evidence is insufficient for field 
preemption.   
                                              
1 We express no opinion on whether similar state law claims 
brought by debtors would be subject to preemption.   
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 Starting with text, § 303(i) provides a remedy to the 
debtor, but is silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors 
harmed by an involuntary bankruptcy petition.  This suggests 
that when Congress passed the provision it either did not 
intend to disturb the existing framework of state law remedies 
for non-debtors or (more likely) was not thinking about non-
debtor remedies at all.  In either case, field preemption does 
not apply.  The Defendants ask us to infer that, by providing a 
remedy to debtors, Congress also meant to deprive non-
debtors of any remedy.2  However, we do not lightly infer 
from congressional silence the intent to deprive some persons 
of a judicial remedy for an abuse of the bankruptcy system.  
As the Supreme Court observed in a preemption case 
concerning the Atomic Energy Act, “[i]t is difficult to believe 
that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of 
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”  
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).   
 Turning to structure and purpose, we see no indication 
of field preemption.  By giving creditors the ability to bring a 
debtor into bankruptcy, Congress created a power that could 
be abused.  Given the risks of involuntary petitions, it 
included a remedy for debtors to discourage abuse.  In re 
Diloreto, 388 B.R. 637, 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 
442 B.R. 373 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Involuntary petitions, even 
ones filed in good faith, can have a significant negative effect 
                                              
2 The Defendants also suggested at oral argument that non-
debtors have some remedy under § 303, namely asking the 
Bankruptcy Court to appoint a trustee to “take possession of 
the property of the estate and to operate any business of the 
debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 303(g).  But we do not see how the 
post-petition appointment of a trustee would address the type 
of economic losses the Rosenberg Affiliates alleged in their 
complaint.  
11 
 
upon the interests of a putative debtor . . . . Section 303(i) was 
intended to ameliorate those negative effects by imposing 
liability upon the unsuccessful petitioning creditor . . . .”).   
 Nothing in the Code suggests that Congress was also 
concerned about protecting non-debtors from the effects of 
involuntary petitions.3  That said, it would be inconsistent 
with the remedial purpose of § 303(i) to preempt state law 
remedies for non-debtors that can likewise be harmed by 
involuntary bankruptcy petitions.  See In re John Richards 
Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. 591, 605 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (“[T]he harm from an improper involuntary 
bankruptcy petition can result not only to the debtor but also 
to the debtor’s owners, employees, suppliers, customers and 
other creditors.”). 
 The Defendants point out that, in the automatic stay 
provisions of the Code, Congress provided that any individual 
“injured by any willful violation” of the automatic stay “shall 
recover actual damages.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).  They argue 
this suggests that Congress knew how to provide broad 
remedies that covered non-debtors and declined to do so with 
§ 303(i).  No doubt this reading is plausible.  But field 
preemption requires congressional intent that is clear and 
manifest, and this is lacking when Congress is silent on what 
courts are to do with state law remedies for non-debtors.  
                                              
3 If we were inclined to also look at legislative history for 
clues as to Congress’s thoughts on this subject, we would still 
come out empty-handed.  Section 303(i) was enacted as part 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549, and the House and Senate Reports discussing 
involuntary bankruptcies say nothing about non-debtors, non-
debtor remedies, or preemption.     
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 The Defendants also argue that permitting state law 
claims against creditors would be inconsistent with the 
comprehensive nature of the Bankruptcy Code, the exclusive 
nature of federal court jurisdiction over bankruptcies, and the 
uniform nature of bankruptcy law.  They stoke fears of a 
flood of state court litigation challenging the actions of 
creditors that would chill the use of involuntary bankruptcy 
proceedings and permit state courts to rewrite bankruptcy 
law.  Yet there is no evidence in the text, structure, or purpose 
of the Code that Congress was concerned with this outcome.  
Moreover, the fears of the Defendants are based more on 
conjecture than fact.  They cite only a handful of state court 
cases where non-debtors brought state tort claims against 
petitioning creditors.  E.g., PNH, Inc. v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 940 
N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (purchasers of 
corporation’s debt brought tortious interference, abuse of 
process, and defamation claims against creditors who filed 
involuntary petition against corporation).  In these 
circumstances, we are not convinced by a floodgates 
argument to support a finding of field preemption.       
 As for concerns that permitting state law claims will 
undermine uniformity in bankruptcy law, we rejected a very 
similar argument in U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 
F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2002).  That case addressed whether the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preempt state law tort 
claims based on misconduct in federal litigation.  We held 
they did not but observed there were “legitimate public policy 
concerns in concluding that the federal rules foreclose state 
claims in the nature of abuse of process arising out of federal 
litigation.”  Id. at 394.  Even though there would be conflicts 
between the federal rules and state law and “federal 
preemption would forestall such controversies,” we were 
content to “rely on the traditional comity between the two 
systems to deal adequately and innovatively with such 
common problems.”  Id.  We rely on that same comity today 
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and trust that state courts faithfully will account for federal 
bankruptcy law to the extent it may be relevant to a state law 
claim against a creditor.   
 Finally, the Defendants urge us to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision of In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1083, a decision 
the District Court found persuasive when it dismissed the 
Rosenberg Affiliates’ complaint.  Non-debtors there were 
allegedly harmed by an involuntary bankruptcy and brought 
state law tort claims against the petitioning creditors in state 
court.  Id. at 1086–87.  The creditors removed the case to 
federal court and the Ninth Circuit held that the state law tort 
claims were removable because they were “completely 
preempted” by § 303(i).  Id. at 1093 n.6.4  This was so 
                                              
4 Complete preemption is not the same as field preemption, 
and the two concepts should not be confused.  Complete 
preemption “operates to confer original federal subject matter 
jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of 
action on the face of the complaint.”  In re U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).  It applies when the 
preemptive force of a federal statute is so “extraordinary” that 
it “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one 
stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule.”  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 
393 (1987) (quoting Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 
58, 65 (1987)).  Our case deals with field preemption, a 
species of “ordinary preemption” that operates as a federal 
defense to a state law claim, and has nothing to do with 
subject matter jurisdiction.  For this reason, Miles could be 
deemed distinguishable.  But we recognize that finding 
complete preemption in the context § 303(i) would also 
support finding field preemption in our case.   
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because “Congress intended 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) to provide the 
exclusive basis for awarding damages predicated upon the 
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”  Id. at 1089.  
Once convinced that the case was properly removed, the 
Court dismissed the complaint because the non-debtors 
lacked standing under § 303(i) to recover damages.  Id. at 
1093.    
 We do not find Miles persuasive on the preemption 
issue.5  To start, its analysis of § 303(i) is inconsistent with 
our decision in Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 
842 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1988), where we held that § 303(i) is 
not an exclusive remedy for debtors who convert an 
involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition to a voluntary 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  U.S. Express Lines Ltd., 281 F.3d 
at 393 n.5 (noting that Miles is in tension with Paradise 
Hotel).  We also think the analysis is inconsistent with the 
presumption against preemption, which, as we have 
discussed, requires that congressional intent to preempt state 
law must be clear and manifest.  In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. Inc., 
                                                                                                     
We also note that if complete preemption were at issue in this 
case, we doubt it would apply.  The Supreme Court has found 
complete preemption in three contexts: § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, § 502(a) of ERISA, and §§ 85 
and 86 of the National Bank Act.  New Jersey Carpenters & 
the Trustees Thereof, 760 F.3d at 302.  It has never 
recognized complete preemption in the Bankruptcy Code, and 
it seems the Ninth Circuit stands alone in this regard.  See In 
re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 724 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to follow Miles). 
 
5 As noted above, we do agree with the Miles Court that non-
debtors lack standing under § 303(i) to recover damages and 
do not take issue with this portion of its opinion.   
15 
 
684 F.3d at 365.  Near the beginning of its analysis, the Miles 
Court admitted that the “Bankruptcy Code and its legislative 
history are silent on whether Congress intended 11 U.S.C. 
§ 303(i) to provide the exclusive basis for awarding damages 
predicated upon the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition.”  430 F.3d at 1089.  If we apply faithfully the 
presumption against preemption, silence on the part of 
Congress should be the end of the analysis.  But the Court 
went on to “infer from Congress’s clear intent to provide 
damage awards only to the debtor . . . that Congress did not 
intend [non-debtors] to be able to circumvent this rule by 
pursuing those very claims in state court.”  Id. at 1091.  
Absent evidence that Congress actually meant for § 303(i) to 
be an exclusive remedy, we do not make the same inference.6 
*     *     *     *     * 
                                              
6 The Defendants argue in the alternative that we can affirm 
on the basis of the statute of limitations, an issue the District 
Court did not reach.  “It is an accepted tenet of appellate 
jurisdiction that we ‘may affirm a judgment on any ground 
apparent from the record, even if the district court did not 
reach it.’”  Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 
F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Kabakjian v. United 
States, 267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We decline to 
affirm on that alternate ground in this case because it is 
unclear from the record when the Rosenberg Affiliates were 
injured and when their tortious interference claim accrued.  
We do not know from the complaint, for example, when the 
NMI Real Estate Partnerships defaulted on their mortgages or 
when the Rosenberg Trust suffered its losses.  Accordingly, 
we will leave the statute-of-limitations issue to the District 
Court on remand.   
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 In this context, we hold that Bankruptcy Code § 303(i) 
does not preempt state law claims by non-debtors for 
damages based on the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings.     
